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Interview with Larry A. Hickman
Michela Bella, Matteo Santarelli and Larry A. Hickman
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – What was the state of Pragmatism studies when you
first encountered pragmatism?
Larry A.  HICKMAN –  After  completing  my  undergraduate  degree  in  psychology  I
decided that I wanted to study philosophy. In order to prepare for graduate school, I
spent a  year taking philosophy courses  at  the University  of  Texas in Austin.  The
faculty  included  Charles  Hartshorne,  who  was  co-editor  of  the  Peirce  Collected
Papers. There was also David L. Miller and George Gentry, both of whom had been
students of George Herbert Mead. I was particularly interested in Charles Sanders
Peirce. After I was admitted to the graduate program I took a graduate seminar on
Peirce offered by Irwin Lieb. 
I  read Peirce’s remark that logic is the study of second intentions applied to first
intentions. I had no idea what that meant, so I asked around the department. Only
one professor, Ignacio Angelelli, seemed to have an idea. He said “I don’t know the
answer to your question, but I can help you find out. First, however you have to learn
to read Latin.” So I took intensive Latin courses and with his help I spent the next
couple of years reading what the 16th century Thomists, Scotists, and Nominalists
said about first and second intentions. I  was reading some of the same Scholastic
logicians that Peirce had read. After I finished my dissertation I spent almost two
years of research in Germany supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation
and then published my own book on the subject. Now Peirce scholars can find out
what he meant by that  remark.  So what did Peirce mean? Well,  it  had to do his
interest in properties of properties. Beyond that, you just have to read my 1980 book
Modern Theories of Higher Level Predicates.
After  I  returned  from  Germany  in  1973  I  taught  courses  on  the  philosophy  of
technology at Texas A&M. My interest expanded outward from Peirce to James and
Dewey and I began to teach courses in American philosophy. 
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Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – What was the reception of Pragmatism in the United
States in the Sixties?
Larry A. HICKMAN – You will notice that I have so far avoided the term “pragmatism.”
This is probably an appropriate place to quote Dewey’s letter to his colleague A. W.
Moore. “I have never known a myth grow so rapidly as that of ‘pragmatism.’ To read
its critics one would think it was a positive system set forth for centuries in hundreds
of volumes, & that its critics were the ones engaged in a tentative development of
new & undogmatic  ideas.  But  I  object  root  and branch to  the  term ‘pragmatism’
(except in its origin limited sense)…” (January 2, 1905). I suppose I’ll follow Dewey in
saying that pragmatism in the strict sense can more or less be summed up in Peirce’s
maxim and the ways it was adapted by James and Dewey. I’ve so far talked about
American  philosophy  because  it  comprises  a  broader  set  of  issues  and  problems
among which pragmatism is but a part.
That having been said, however, I have to admit that during the late 1960s I was busy
writing my dissertation and my information about what was being taught at various
universities around the country was more or less anecdotal, with the exception of
what was going on at Yale, which had a close relationship with some universities in
Texas. From the graduate courses I was taking and the meetings of the Southwestern
Philosophical Society, however, I was generally aware that analytic philosophy, both
the ideal language and ordinary language varieties, was more or less dominant in
that region, as it certainly was at the meetings of the APA.
It  was  also  becoming  clear  that  philosophy  at  many  Catholic  universities  was
beginning to drift away from Thomism toward Continental philosophy and there was
some interest in American philosophy there as well. Quine was, of course, very big.
There was also a lot of interest in the Oxbridge philosophers, especially Ryle, Austin,
and Wittgenstein. It was very difficult for Americanists to get papers accepted at APA,
and I have been told that you couldn’t find a course on William James at Harvard
during those years. 
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – How did Dewey come into the picture? Was it because
of technology?
Larry A. HICKMAN – I was teaching courses in the philosophy of technology as well as
American philosophy. It began to dawn on me that Dewey had a great deal to say
about technology. At that time nobody had noticed that except Webster Hood, who
wrote one brief, elegant essay on the subject. But there it was, clear as could be, in
the introduction to his 1916 Essays in Experimental Logic, for example, where Dewey
was  writing about  watch springs  and telephones  and treating  logical  objects  and
other concepts as tools instead of metaphysical or psychological entities. 
At that point I was active in the Society for Philosophy and Technology. I realized
that it was important to introduce Dewey into those conversations, because at that
time it was mainly Heidegger and Jacques Ellul with their ideas about autonomous
technology;  it  was  the  Frankfurt  School  with  their  critique  of  instrumental
rationality,  all  very negative,  anti-technology approaches.  But  Dewey was writing
about technology before any of them, and he was very positive about the promise of
technology. For the Europeans, technology was the problem. For Dewey, technology
was never the problem because of the way he thought that we as humans inhabit the
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world as problem solvers who use tools, including ideas, to adapt to our changing
circumstances. That was the path to focusing on Dewey as a research project. 
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – Did you join the SAAP from the beginning?
Larry A. HICKMAN – No, I was not an original member of the SAAP. Their first meeting
was in 1974, I believe, and I was more or less unaware of the organization until John
McDermott came to Texas A&M as department head about 1976.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – At that time you did not have the sense of a community
of  pragmatism  scholars  but  you  were  working on  the  philosophy  of  technology  using
Dewey rather than Heidegger. 
Larry A. HICKMAN – Up to the time I attended the first meeting of SAAP I had very little
sense of a community of pragmatist philosophers apart from a couple of colleagues in
the department. But McDermott was very well connected. Texas A&M was still quite
isolated, so he brought in people for lectures from other parts of the country and he
hosted a meeting of SAAP in College Station. 
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – When did you get involved in the SAAP?
Larry A. HICKMAN – John McDermott brought the annual meeting of SAAP to Texas
A&M in about 1978 or 1979. It was a very small group, with maybe 20 people. The
party at the end of the meeting would have been in somebody’s kitchen. I mean it was
that small. I was greatly impressed by the society. At the APA there was what the
Village Voice once called a “designated hit man” for every paper, that is,  someone
there to try to demolish your argument. At SAAP it was different. There was a spirit
of cooperative inquiry, and especially a lot of support for younger members.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – What about the perception of the rest of America in the
1970s.  It  was becoming more and more analytic,  I  suppose.  Which was the feeling of
pragmatists? Was it that of a minority?
Larry A. HICKMAN – There was a feeling of being marginal. I was sometimes asked if I
was doing philosophy or the history of philosophy. I usually responded with another
question: “How can you do one without the other?” In a way I suppose there was a
tendency to organize around the editions – Peirce, Dewey, James, Royce – where the
center of gravity was in those days. The important thing was to provide access to the
texts.  McDermott selected one or two volume editions of James in 1967, Royce in
1969,  and Dewey in 1973.  Jo Ann Boydston published the first  volume of  Dewey’s
Collected  Works in  1967,  and  the  first  volume  of  The  Works  of  William  James  was
published in 1975. 
In 1979 SAAP commissioned a survey of courses in American philosophy in the U.S.
There were at least some offerings in about 21 of the 73 universities that responded.
In  the  rest,  Chicago,  Colorado,  Cornell,  Duke,  Harvard,  Illinois,  MIT,  Michigan,
Northwestern,  Princeton,  Stanford,  Virginia,  and  so  on,  there  was  no  American
philosophy taught.
Of course in 1979 there was Richard Rorty’s famous presidential address at the APA
during which he said that philosophers ought to read James and Dewey. Many of the
analysts felt betrayed. And a little later there was the pluralist revolt at the APA,
which  finally  forced  its  leaders  to  hold  democratic  elections  and  reach  out  to
Americanists and Continentalists. As I said, during the 1970s departments at Catholic
universities  were  turning  away  from  Thomism  toward  Continental  philosophy  –
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Heidegger, especially – with some emphasis on American philosophy as well. Many of
the members of SAAP during that time taught at Catholic universities.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – Even in philosophy of technology did you have difficulty
in making Dewey’s view acknowledged?
Larry A.  HICKMAN –  Yes.  Some  of  my  colleagues  in  the  SPT  had  a  hard  time
understanding  what  I  was  taking  about.  I  got  support  from  Paul  Durbin,  who
identified himself as a pragmatist, as well as from Carl Mitcham, Bryan Norton, Paul
Thompson, and others. But many of my colleagues thought Dewey’s characterization
of technology was just weird. I would say things like “What a novelist is doing is a
kind of technology. There are tools, there are raw materials, there are intermediate
stock parts, and there are skills, all of which enter into the finished product. What’s
not technological about that?” And I would tell them that Dewey thought that science
was  a  kind  of  technology.  Some  of  my  colleagues  in  the  SPT  who  were  used  to
thinking mostly about engineering and treating technology as applied science, would
tell me that was crazy. What do novels have to do with technology? They wanted to
maintain dualisms of  tangible/intangible,  subject/object  that  Dewey rejected.  Don
Ihde was also sympathetic to what I was doing. In his 1993 book Postphenomenology he
reported that Dewey’s pragmatism had influenced his work. He has since described
postphenomenology as a blend of pragmatism and phenomenology.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – Do you think your works on Dewey’s philosophy of
technology has favored a more positive pragmatists’ opening/approaches to technology?
Larry A. HICKMAN – Yes, but indirectly. The vogue has changed partially through the
work of Don Ihde and others in the camp of postphenomenology (Ihde’s term, by the
way). When I published John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology in 1990, it was one of three
books that inaugurated the Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Technology. The other
two were Ihde’s book Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth, and Michael E.
Zimmerman’s Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art. Ihde had
read my book because he was the editor of the series. In his very next book you can
see a pragmatic turn in his own thinking. I think he was there already but he had not
fully articulated it. In the introduction to his book Postphenomenology, he wrote that
he had been sympathetic with pragmatism for a long time but that two people helped
him bring it out. One was Rorty, and I was the other one. He has since influenced a
generation of Dutch philosophers of technology who want to get past Heidegger’s and
Jaspers’  negativity  and  metaphysics,  and  Ellul’s  reification  of  an  autonomous
technology, in order to effect an empirical turn. Peter-Paul Verbeek, for example,
wrote a wonderful book called What Things Do that consigns Heidegger and Jaspers to
a “classical” period of the philosophy of technology that can be safely bracketed. So
at least indirectly the postphenomenologists have been influenced by Dewey. Like
Dewey, they want to bracket the ontology and look instead at functions – what things
do. So that’s the direction philosophy of technology has gone recently. The problem
with understanding Dewey’s take on technology is that it is not in any one place: it is
there all  throughout his work. As someone said,  we do not know who discovered
water but we are pretty sure it wasn’t the fish! So you swim around in Dewey’s many
publications  and it  is  easy  to  miss  what  is  effectively  the  very  environment.  His
treatment of technology is everywhere, like water to the fish, so it is hard to see it.
That’s why I wrote John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology – to show people where to look. 
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Michela  BELLA &  Matteo  SANTARELLI –  Talking  about  your  work  not  only  in  terms  of
scholarship, what do you think is your major contribution?
Larry A.  HICKMAN –  There  are  several  things  that  I  might  mention.  As  I  said,  I
published the first extended development of a pragmatist approach to the philosophy
of  technology.  There  is  also  my  continuing  critique  of  certain  vectors  in
“postmodernism” from a pragmatic standpoint. There is still work to be done in that
area. I tried to do a bit of that in my book Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism. 
The big thing is the editorial projects at the Dewey Center: the electronic edition of
the  Collected  Works, the  four  volumes  of  the  Correspondence, the  two  volumes  of
Dewey’s  Class  Lectures, and  Works  about  Dewey. These  have  all  been  collaborative
projects, and I cannot praise the editors at the Center for Dewey Studies enough for
the  energy  and  dedication  that  they  brought  to  these  projects.  It  has  been  an
interesting  and  sometimes  difficult  process  raising  the  funds  to  keep  the  Dewey
projects  going for  some twenty  years,  but  we have  succeeded.  It  is  important  to
emphasize  that  the  type  of  editing  we  do  at  the  Dewey  Center  is  very  much  a
scholarly activity. Choices have to be made, and they must be informed by careful
scholarship.  The  editions  –  Dewey,  James,  Santayana,  Peirce,  Royce  –  represent
scholarship that has made other types of scholarship possible. We edit the texts and
then  other  scholars  build  on  our  work  to  write  their  essays  and  books  such  as
intellectual  biographies,  for  example.  Works  by  Steven  Rockefeller,  Jay  Martin,
Robert  Westbrook,  to  name  a  few,  would  not  have  been  possible  without  the
resources that have been developed at the Dewey Center.
I’m also  pleased  to  have  had  a  part  in  establishing  several  sister  Dewey  Centers
around the world. The full list by country now includes China, Japan, France, Italy,
Spain, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Argentina, and Brazil.  I’ve
done a lot of traveling over the years, logging in an average of about one external
presentation per month for more than 20 years. Someone once called me the “Johnny
Appleseed of pragmatism.” I happily accept that.
I’ll add one more thing. My wife Liz Porter and I decided that SAAP needed a summer
institute, so we organized the first one in Burlington, Vermont in 1998, as I recall.
Now, some 20 years later, thanks to the work of a lot of people including Scott Pratt,
the summer institute is still going.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – Considering the work of people like Richard Bernstein,
would you restrain the boundaries of the pragmatism conversation? Or rather, would you
consider the pragmatist family to be smaller than Bernstein pretends it to be?
Larry A.  HICKMAN –  It  does  seem  that  today  just  about  everybody  claims  to  be  a
pragmatist of one sort or another. I’m not interested in making judgments about who
is in the club and who is not. As far as I am concerned, we should let a thousand
flowers bloom. But I would just invite you to recall my earlier citation of Dewey’s
remark that he understood pragmatism in a very narrow sense. What many people
have identified as his pragmatism, I believe, is more or less what he summed up as his
own  philosophical  method  as  opposed  to  “pragmatism”  in  its  limited  sense.  In
another part of that letter to A. W. Moore that I quoted earlier he says: “Any name
can only be one sided, and so it seems a pity to have any. Radical empiricism begs as
few  as  any,  though  I  should  prefer  the  term  experimentalism  to  empiricism.
Philosophy is Functionalism in the sense that it treats only of functions of experience
(not  of  facts,  nor  of  states,  ideas,  &);  it  is  Geneticism as  a  mode  of  analyzing  &
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identifying these functions; it is Instrumentalism as a theory of the significance of the
Knowledge-function;  it  is  Experimentalism as  a  theory of  the test  of  worth of  all
functions.”
So I would say that some neo-pragmatists seem to have taken an alternative path – a
linguistic turn away from the path of experimentalism, functionalism, geneticism,
and instrumentalism that Dewey recommended. Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead – they
were all  involved in some sort  of  scientific  work,  so I  expect  that  they would be
surprised  that  some  self-described  pragmatists  today  have  so  little  to  say  about
technology (which is, after all, our environment). Then there is the matter that some
of the dualisms that Dewey fought so hard to eject from philosophical discourse seem
to  keep  creeping  back  into  discussions.  Some  pragmatists  even  seem  happily
employed in the “epistemology industry” about which Dewey warned us. There is
also the matter of respect for the texts. As an editor I’m sometimes quite surprised to
read what some pragmatists write about the “mistakes” of what someone has termed
“paleo-pragmatists” such as Dewey and James. (I don’t like the term much, since it
calls up images of dinosaurs.) The texts are our scholarly navigational tools. If we
don’t give them their due, then we will be off on some other trip. So it is none of my
business what people call themselves. As a pragmatist (in the narrow sense in which
Peirce and Dewey understood the term) however, I am sometimes amused a some of
the ways the term has been used.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – When did the project of editing Dewey’s works start?
Larry A. HICKMAN – That was in 1961. George E. Axtelle started a small Dewey project
at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. He wanted to put together a concordance
of Dewey’s work. But it didn’t take long for him to realize that in order to have a
concordance you have to have a standard edition. When Axtelle left SIU his assistant,
Jo  Ann  Boydston,  became  the  editor.  Over  the  next  30  years  she  and  her  staff
produced the 37 volumes of Dewey’s Collected Works. She worked with the Modern
Language Association (MLA) to establish standards for editorial procedures. Each of
her volumes received the seal of approval of the Committee on Scholarly Editions of
the MLA. She retired in 1992. Volume 4 of the Dewey Correspondence contains an
interview I did with Jo Ann about the history of the Center.
 Michela  BELLA &  Matteo  SANTARELLI –  Why did  you  decide  to  enter  the  Dewey’s  editorial
project, hence moving to Southern Illinois University?
Larry A. HICKMAN – I had some experience editing journals. I liked editing and I felt it
was important. But also given my interests the Dewey Center position was a perfect
job.  I  arrived at  the  Center  in  1993.  My immediate  tasks  were  to  raise  funds,  to
produce an electronic edition of Dewey’s correspondence and to publish an electronic
edition of  Dewey’s  Collected  Works. We completed the  Collected  Works project  first,
since it was already in print, and we have since completed (electronic) editions of the
four  volumes  of  the  Correspondence and  two  volumes  of  Dewey’s  Class  Lectures.
Although our publications have in the main been electronic, we have published some
print volumes as well. I estimate that on average we have published the equivalent of
about five 500 page print volumes every year for the past 20 years.
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Michela  BELLA &  Matteo  SANTARELLI –  What  do  you  think  is  the  situation  of  Dewey’s
scholarship in the world?
Larry A. HICKMAN – There is a lot of interest and it is growing. The number of Dewey
research centers  is  one indication.  Barbara Levine,  who compiles  and edits  Works
about Dewey, tells me she is astounded at the proliferation of books and essays about
Dewey. It has been growing steadily over the past 20 years. I think a lot of it has to do
with Dewey’s work on democracy and education. I go to places where I would not
expect anyone to know much about Dewey, but I often find that there are teachers
who use his methods, and that there are philosophers and political scientists and
even activists who want to see their countries adopt the ideas about democracy that
Dewey promoted. 
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – Do you think the Putnam-Rorty controversy had to do
with that or was that not fundamental for making pragmatism more known?
Larry A. HICKMAN – Rorty played a major role when he delivered that 1979 presidential
address at APA. He was also a member of the board of the John Dewey Foundation for
two decades. And the Rorty/Putnam debate has greatly raised the profile of American
philosophy. Rorty was of course greatly influenced by French postmodernist writers,
and  he  raised  the  eyebrows  of  more  than  one  Dewey  scholar  with  his
pronouncements  about  what  he  thought  Dewey  either  said  or  should  have  said.
During recent years I think Putnam has moved a bit towards pragmatism, perhaps
pushed a bit  by Ruth Anna Putnam. But there is  still  a big gap between him and
Dewey, for example, on issues such as truth and representationalism. I contributed
an essay on Putnam and Dewey to the Library of Living Philosophers volume dedicated
to him. (In his reply he disagreed with a good deal of what I had to say.) I think it has
been extremely important to have the contributions of Rorty and Putnam, and even
their famous debate, if only because if you go to a place like Argentina, for example,
you  find  that  there  are  three  branches  of  philosophy:  Marxism,  Continental
philosophy, and analytic philosophy. Pragmatism is considered a subset of analytic
philosophy since students get to Dewey through Rorty (and now through McDowell
and Brandom).
The other way you can go is to work forward from the classical pragmatists to the
neo-pragmatists.  In  my view,  which direction you travel  makes  a  difference.  The
classical pragmatists are rooted in the American tradition of the Puritans, Jonathan
Edwards, the Transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau, Whitman, Jefferson, and so
on. When people work backward from Rorty they tend to stop with Dewey and James
and Peirce.  I  myself  have  worked  in  both  directions:  forward  from the  founding
pragmatists  to  the  neopragmatists  as  well  as  backward  to  the  roots  of  classical
pragmatism. 
Bernstein  is  a  different  matter.  He  has  created a  very  important  bridge  between
Dewey,  whose  work  he  knows  very  well,  and  Continental  philosophers  such  as
Hannah Arendt. I’ve suggested that he occupies a position somewhere between Rorty
and Habermas on a number of  issues.  Joseph Margolis,  whose analysis  of  what is
going on in philosophy is almost always right in my view, is surely right on this as
well: the future of American philosophy lies in its ability to find ways of engaging the
Continental and analytic traditions. American philosophy has enormous and unique
resources to bring to bear on that project. As far as I know Margolis doesn’t mention
neo-Confucianism and Buddhism,  but  I  would add those traditions  as  well.  Roger
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Ames is doing some of that, and I’ve been very interested in the similarities between
Dewey’s work and the interpretations of the Lotus Sutra that come through Nichiren
Buddhism, especially as they impact pedagogy.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – Given your logical background, you are in a favorable
position  to  appreciate  the  proximity  between  pragmatism  and  analytic  philosophy,  not
being a priori against analytic philosophy.
Larry A. HICKMAN – When I was studying the history of logic I read a lot of analytic
philosophy, and it has served me well. I have certainly read and greatly appreciated
the work of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Russell and Frege. It is just that after reading
as much Dewey as I have, I see him as having solved some of the problems that some
analytic philosophers are still struggling with, and I see his work as more relevant to
what  he  called  “the  problems  of  men  [and  women].”  The  continuing  quest  for
certainty is one example. Philip Kitcher has suggested that we need to reverse the old
paradigm, the one with logic and epistemology as providing the central philosophical
problems and fields such as ethics and aesthetics as residing at the periphery. I think
he is correct. Logic and epistemology are tools that we need to be able to work on the
central  issues.  But  those  central  issues  include  ethics,  aesthetics,  and  political
philosophy. 
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – How would you locate your work in the pragmatism
tradition or American philosophy?
Larry A. HICKMAN – Apart from being the general editor of the Dewey Correspondence, I
would describe myself as an Americanist who works in the fields of philosophy of
technology  and  philosophy  of  education,  and  who  has  during  the  last  couple  of
decades attempted to get the voices of Dewey and James, especially, inserted into
debates where they are absent. 
Because of my work at the Dewey Center I have had the opportunity to travel a great
deal  and have had occasion to work with philosophers in China,  for example,  on
issues like the relation of Dewey to neo-Confucianism. In Japan I have worked with
Buddhists on issues like the relation of Dewey’s work to the teachings of Nichiren
Buddhism. Jim Garrison and I recently collaborated on a book with Daisaku Ikeda, the
spiritual  leader  of  some 13 million Nichiren Buddhists,  on the importance of  the
educational theories of Dewey and the Japanese educator Tsunesaburo Makiguchi for
the 21st century. In Italy I’ve collaborated with philosophers of education, offering
continuing education courses for teachers. In Vietnam I’ve presented seminars on
Dewey and American democracy at the national research centers for philosophy and
political science. All of this has been an attempt to raise the profile of a philosopher
who I think mostly got things right and who is much more radical and much more
relevant to our current situation than most people understand. 
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – The last part of our interview is about the future. What
is going on, or what is more important to foster? 
Larry A. HICKMAN – Well, I think we are in a very difficult time right now in terms of
the future of higher education, not just in the United States but elsewhere as well.
Everything  seems  to  be  in  flux:  universities  are  being  reconfigured  according  to
business models, and that affects what is taught, how it is taught, and the distribution
of  educational  opportunities.  There  are  the  still  unknown  effects  of  distance
education. The recommendations put forward in the “Browne” report in the U.K. and
the  “Seven  Solutions”  report  in  Texas,  for  example,  are  frightening.  American
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philosophers  can  have  an  enormous  role  in  framing  some  of  these  issues,  given
resources  such  as  Dewey’s educational  theories,  Royce’s  ideas  about  community,
James’ radical empiricism and pluralism, and Peirce’s pragmatism, to say nothing of
Jane  Addams’  ideas  about  inclusion  and  democratic  forms  of  life.  I  expect  that
professional  philosophy  will  become  less  “hyper-professional”  as  the  younger
generation looks for ways to increase the relevance of  what philosophers do.  I’m
already beginning to see some of that.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – People trained in the Deweyan tradition are maybe less
interested in the essential part of the hyper-professionalization of philosophy, but on the
other side this tradition has developed a high sensitivity about how to bring back cultural
reflections to the life of communities, in their vague or specific form. Is it difficult to make it
survive in an academic system that does not seem to leave room enough for more practice
oriented attitudes in philosophers? 
Larry A. HICKMAN – You have put your finger on a very difficult problem, and it is not
a new one. The issue calls to mind a philosopher of education who is not a Deweyan
in terms of self-identification, but who is quite Deweyan in terms of his practice.
Pedro A. Noguera has written well-received books about how to improve education in
underfunded, de facto segregated schools in the inner cities of  the United States.
When  he  was  in  graduate  school  at  Stanford  University  pursuing  a  degree  in
philosophy of education he was also a member of a local school-board. That is a very
Deweyan approach that combines scholarship with practice outside the walls of the
academy. So if graduate students can do it, faculty can do it. Another example: I am
often invited to give talks in Buddhist community centers in places like New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles. The audiences tend to comprise school teachers, lawyers,
doctors, unemployed people – a cross section of the community. The point is that you
can teach and write books and articles and still have time for activities outside the
university.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – This attitude towards ‘philosophy outside the academia’
is a common feature among American scholars of your generation: I am thinking e.g. about
Jacquelyn  Kegley  and John Lachs.  Do you see  this  attitude  towards  the  philosophical
practice to keep on also in younger generations?
Larry A.  HICKMAN –  It  may be  difficult  for  the  younger  generation because  of  the
additional pressures on the younger faculty. With one-year appointments they never
know where they are going to be next year. And even if there are continuing non-
tenure track appointments, there is also the pressure of increasing loads of teaching.
So it is difficult. But I see many younger philosophers just working harder to make a
difference outside the classroom as well as for their students. We will have to resist
increasing attempts to reorganize universities on business models. If it comes to the
point that philosophers are regarded as “knowledge workers” who have clients and
consumers instead of students, then it will be a very sad day for education.
 Michela BELLA & Matteo SANTARELLI – Do you see other important challenges for pragmatism
in the future? Is education the first one?
Larry A. HICKMAN – Yes, absolutely! Education is first, because that is the way that
society renews itself. As university professors we have access to a large number of
students  over  the  span of  our  careers.  What  we  say  makes  a  big  difference.  I’ve
already  mentioned  the  obvious  fact  that  higher  education  is  in  trouble,  and  I’ve
already said something about that. Beyond that, however, I can say that a generation
slightly younger than mine has provided some very good examples of philosophers
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trained  in  or  sympathetic  to  American  philosophy  who  have  been  able  to  make
significant contributions outside academic circles. Paul B. Thompson does work in
the ethics of food biotechnology. Bryan G. Norton has done important work at the
Environmental Protection Agency on environmental sustainability. One of my former
students, Tibor Solymosi is also a good example. I believe he is the one who coined
the term “neuropragmatism.” Jonathan Moreno has made important contributions to
medical ethics and has done work at the Center of American Progress, a progressive
public policy think tank. I think that’s where we are going: more syncretism, with
respect  to  philosophical  orientations  and  engaging  in  research  that  has  the
possibility of changing people’s lives. 
 Michela  BELLA &  Matteo  SANTARELLI –  Only  philosophers  or  sociologists  are  doing  this
intellectual work?
Larry A. HICKMAN – No. There are others as well. Because of my association with the
Dewey Center I get to know people in lots of different fields who conduct intellectual
work outside the fields of philosophy and sociology. Just to mention a few that come
to  mind,  there  are  architects,  engineers,  public  policy  researchers,  public  school
teachers, and historians. But in philosophy there are still people who want to hang on
to some of the old problems. There are people still publishing and getting tenure by
worrying about the problem of other minds and whether we can know that we have
interior  states!  I  saw  an  old  professor  of  mine  from  many  years  ago  at  an  APA
meeting. I had not seen him in more than two decades. I asked him how he was doing.
He said “Let me check my internal states.” And sometimes we wonder why the public
thinks philosophers are irrelevant. 
I don’t want to end on that negative note however. I see enormous energy in the
younger  generation  of  philosophers.  Some  of  my  graduate  students  are  doing
marvelous things. Eric Weber, for example, who works in the area of public policy
leadership at the University of Mississippi, recently published a book on democracy
and leadership in the southern part of the United States. And I could go on, but it is
probably time to stop. Thanks for the opportunity to respond to your questions.
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